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Abstract
This Note argues that, given the ambiguous language and legislative history of the statute,
courts should defer to OFAC’s decisions concerning the definition of other “informational ma-
terials” in the Berman Amendment. Part I describes the varying levels of protection offered by
the First Amendment and the power of the executive branch to block the import or export of in-
formational materials pursuant to TWEA. Part II sets forth the federal courts’ conflicting views
with respect to the scope of materials exempted from regulation. Part III argues that courts should
defer to OFAC decisions regarding the materials exempted from presidential regulation because
the language and legislative history of the Berman Amendment fail to specify clearly the infor-
mational materials that are exempt from regulation and because these decisions do not violate the
independent constraints imposed by the First Amendment. This Note concludes that U.S. courts
should refrain under the doctrine of separation of powers from legislating the meaning of “other
informational materials” in this foreign affairs area where OFAC has clarified the meaning of an
ambiguous statutory phrase.
TRADE WITH CUBA UNDER THE TRADING WITH THE
ENEMY ACT: A FREE FLOW OF IDEAS AND
INFORMATION?
INTRODUCTION
The Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA") authorizes
the U.S. President, in times of national emergency, to impose
embargoes on transactions between the United States and
targeted countries. Congress enacted the Berman Amend-
ment to TWEA to limit presidential authority in regulating the
import and export of informational materials.2 The Office of
Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), the agency charged with
administering TWEA, subsequently issued regulations that in-
terpreted the Berman Amendment to prohibit presidential
regulation of the import of informational materials.3
U.S. federal courts disagree, however, with respect to the
scope of the materials Congress exempted from presidential
regulation.4 At issue is the meaning of the phrase "other in-
formational materials" within the Berman Amendment and its
regulations. 5 Although one court has restricted the Berman
Amendment to affect only tangible forms of informational
materials such as books and magazines,6 another has inter-
1. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988).
2. See id. § 5(b)(4) (1988) [hereinafter Berman Amendment].
3. 31 C.F.R. § 515.332(b)(2) (1991).
4. See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(deferring to OFAC decision which exempted only tangible informational materials
from presidential regulation); Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(stating in dicta that all informational materials are exempted by Berman Amend-
ment from presidential regulation).
5. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 515.332 (b)(2) (1991). The
Berman Amendment provides that
[t]he authority granted to the President in this subsection does not include
the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, the importation
... or the exportation ... whether commercial or otherwise, of publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche,
tapes, or other informational materials.
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (1988) (emphasis added). The Regulations define "informa-
tional materials" to exclude "intangible items such as telecommunication transmis-
sions." 31 C.F.R. § 515.332(b)(2) (1991).
6. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1015 (deferring to OFAC decision that exempts
only tangible informational materials from presidential regulation because language
and legislative history of Berman Amendment are unclear as to which materials are
exempt from presidential regulation and because these decisions do not violate First
Amendment).
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preted the Berman Amendment to exempt from regulation the
importation of all informational materials protected by the
First Amendment.7
This Note argues that, given the ambiguous language and
legislative history of the statute, courts should defer to OFAC's
decisions concerning the definition of other "informational
materials" in the Berman Amendment. Part I describes the va-
rying levels of protection offered by the First Amendment and
the power of the executive branch to block the import or ex-
port of informational materials pursuant to TWEA. Part II sets
forth the federal courts' conflicting views with respect to the
scope of materials exempted from regulation. Part III argues
that courts should defer to OFAC decisions regarding the
materials exempted from presidential regulation because the
language and legislative history of the Berman Amendment fail
to specify clearly the informational materials that are exempt
from regulation and because these decisions do not violate the
independent constraints imposed by the First Amendment.
This Note concludes that U.S. courts should refrain under the
doctrine of separation of powers from legislating the meaning
of "other informational materials" in this foreign affairs area
where OFAC has clarified the meaning of an ambiguous statu-
tory phrase.
I. TRADING WITH CUBA UNDER TWEA AND THE
BERMAN AMENDMENT
A. First Amendment Protection of Freedom of Speech
The text of the First Amendment suggests the existence of
an absolute right to free speech.8 The framers of the U.S.
Constitution recognized public debate as essential to a free so-
ciety9 and, in turn, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
7. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1550 n.10. The Cernuda court stated that "the point
of the 1988 TWEA amendment [is to] totally exempt[ ] from prohibition or regula-
tion the import of ideas and information protected by the First Amendment." Id.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in part that "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." Id.; see
William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107,
110-11 (1982) (reviewing First Amendment protection of speech).
9. See 9 WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910). In 1822,
James Madison stated that "[a] popular Government, without popular information,
or a means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both." id.
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centrality of freedom of speech as a precondition of the exer-
cise of all other freedoms.' 0 The Supreme Court, however,
has limited free speech protections by means of the categoriza-
tion of speech."
The Court protects freedom of speech to differing degrees
based on the perceived importance of the speech in preserving
or encouraging political and social debate.'2 Speech of a polit-
10. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (stating freedom of
expression essential to all other freedoms), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). In reference to freedom of speech, the Court in
Palko stated that "[o]f that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensa-
ble condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Id. at 327; see Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (stating freedom of speech to be basic ele-
ment of liberty). In reference to freedom of speech and of the press, the Court in
Schaefer stated that "they are so intimate to liberty in everyone's convictions-we may
say feelings-that there is an instinctive and instant revolt from any limitation of
them either by law or a charge under the law." Id.
11. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (reaffirming that reli-
gious worship and discussion are entitled to First Amendment protection); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976) (recognizing limited constitutional protection of commercial speech);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (holding obscenity to be outside
First Amendment protection), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (holding ex-
pression pertaining to political campaigns entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (observing that First
Amendment does not protect speech that is not essential to exposition of ideas, of
little social value, and whose benefit is exceeded by societal interest in morality and
order).
The Supreme Court considers certain speech, such as obscenity, to be totally
undeserving of First Amendment protection. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973) (reaffirming that obscenity is not protected by First Amendment); Roth, 354
U.S. at 483 (same). Criminal solicitation is also unprotected by the First Amend-
ment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100 (McKinney 1978); see also Kent Greenawalt, Speech
and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645 (1980). The Supreme Court upholds re-
strictions on speech where there is a "clear and present danger" that such speech will
bring about unlawful action. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see
also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; 447 (1969). In Schenck, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The
Supreme Court in Brandenburg stated that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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ical or religious nature is accorded full First Amendment pro-
tection because of its contribution to responsible discourse in a
free society. 13  Moreover, the government cannot restrict
speech based on its subject matter or content because to do so
would curtail public debate essential to a free society.' 4
Governmental regulation of fully protected speech may be
valid, however, depending on the circumstances surrounding
the speech,' 5 and in particular, because the expression may be
considered to be incompatible with the normal activity of a
given location.' 6 For example, although television broadcasts
are protected by the First Amendment, they must comply with
applicable Federal Communications Commission regula-
17tions.
The Supreme Court recognizes an intermediate level of
protection for speech categorized as commercial speech, pri-
marily with respect to advertising.' 8 To protect consumers
and the free flow of commercial information, the Court re-
quires that valid restrictions on commercial speech pass a four-
prong test.'9 The Supreme Court, however, has 'not articu-
13. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (recognizing full First Amendment protec-
tion of religious worship and discussion); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (recognizing full First Amendment protection of
political speech).
14. See, e.g, Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (refusing to uphold
city ordinance that distinguished between peaceful labor picketing and other peace-
ful picketing).
15. See Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 648-49 (1981) (reaffirming that protected speech is subject to restrictions on
time, place, and manner of expression); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790'(1989); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969).
16. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (upholding anti-noise ordinance because of incom-
patibility with classwork in school).
17. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); CBS, Inc. v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367 (upholding "fairness
doctrine" that requires each side of public issue to be provided fair coverage).
18. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (establishing intermediate level of scrutiny for restraint of commercial
speech); see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-75 (1983) (employ-
ing four-prong test to strike down postal prohibition on mailing of unsolicited con-
traceptive advertisements); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-07 (1982) (employing
four-prong test to strike down court rule regulating attorney advertising); Me-
tromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.. 490, 507 (1981) (employing four-prong test to
uphold zoning ordinance restricting billboard advertising).
19. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. For commercial speech to receive First
Amendment protection, the speech
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lated clear standards for determining the nature and circum-
stances of expression that constitutes commercial speech.20
The Supreme Court also has considered government reg-
ulation of conduct involving a combination of protected
speech with non-speech elements in United States v. O'Brien.2'
The Supreme Court in O'Brien held that when the conduct con-
tains a combination of elements of speech and non-speech, an
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech
element may excuse incidental restriction of free speech.22
The O'Brien standard of review permits a governmental restric-
tion of speech if the restriction is within the government's con-
stitutional power, furthers an important governmental interest,
is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and is no greater
than necessary to further that interest.23
In the international context, courts uphold restrictions of
First Amendment expression that would be unconstitutional in
the domestic context.2 4 In particular, courts sustain such gov-
ernmental limitations of communication when these restric-
tions promote national security and foreign policy. 25
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more ex-
tensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.; see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (stating free flow of commercial information as central to a
free enterprise economy).
20. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press, the
Supreme Court defined commercial speech as speech that does "no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction." Id. at 385. The Supreme Court also defined com-
mercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22. Id. at 376-77.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 (1969). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Teague allowed a total prohibition of the import of informational materials- publi-
cations from China and North Vietnam-prior to the enactment of the Berman
Amendment. Id. The court in Teague found that the restriction of communications
was incidental to the pursuit of an important governmental interest in limiting the
flow of currency to the "hostile" nations. Id. at 445.
25. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding agreement
by plaintiff not to divulge classified information without pre-publication clearance).
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B. The Executive's Power to Bar the Flow of Information Under
TWEA
Congress created an instrument for restricting the flow of
information when it enacted TWEA.26 Under TWEA, Con-
gress authorizes the President to prohibit certain transactions
with designated countries in an effort to advance foreign policy
goals.27 The Berman Amendment, however, limited this
power by exempting the import or export of informational
materials from presidential regulation.28
1. Executive Power Under TWEA Prior to the Berman
Amendment
a. TWEA Section 5(b)
Congress broadened the executive's powers when it en-
acted TWEA upon the U.S.. entry into World War J.29 Section
5(b) of TWEA authorizes the President, during national emer-
gencies, to impose embargoes on transactions between the
United States and designated "hostile" countries. 30 Congress
26. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988)). The judiciary traditionally recognizes
broad executive power in the realm of foreign affairs because of national security and
foreign policy interests. See, e.g. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984); Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Chicago & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Supreme Court in Waterman stated
that
[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret .... They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility and which have long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d
560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988).
28. Id. § 5(b)(4).
29. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988)).
30. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988). Section 5(b)(l)(B) authorizes the President to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealings in, or exercising any right,
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designed TWEA as a permanent piece of legislation to meet
both present and future wartime and peacetime conditions.3 '
TWEA's original purpose was at the same time designed to
cause little disruption in normal relations with enemy aliens
while keeping assets out of enemy control.32 The constitution-
ality of this presidential power enabled the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Cus-
toms"s to uphold, pursuant to TWEA, a total prohibition of the
importation of all informational materials from China and
North Vietnam prior to the Berman Amendment, because the
limitation of communication was incidental to the important
purpose of the statute of limiting the flow of currency to those
countries.S4
b. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations
In 1962, President Kennedy declared a national emer-
gency after Communist forces gained control of Cuba as a re-
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property
in which any foreign country or national thereof has any interest.
Id. It should be noted that the word "authorizes" is used to indicate that such power
does not inherently lie with the Executive. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. This
power is granted by Congress, which itself has the power to regulate foreign com-
merce and commerce among the states. Id. See generally Regan, 468 U.S. at 226 n.2;
Yoshida, 526 F.2d 560 (stating that President and OFAC have no inherent power to
regulate foreign commerce); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007,
1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
31. IREDELL MEARES, THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT 7 (1924).
32. Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). In Miller v. Robertson,
the Court stated that "[t]he purpose [of TWEA] was to weaken enemy countries by
depriving their supporters of power to give aid." Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243,
248 (1924). Also, in Sutherland v. Mayer, the Court stated that "[t]he purpose of the
restriction is ... to preclude the possibility of aid or comfort, direct or indirect, to the
opposing forces." Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272, 287 (1926).
33. 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 (1969).
34. Id. at 445. The court in Teague stated that
[i]t is true that the regulations result in some limitation on the availability of
publications and films originating in China, North Korea, and North Viet-
nam. To the extent of this limitation the regulations impinge on first
amendment freedoms. However, restricting the flow of information or ideas
is not the purpose of the regulations. The restriction of first amendment
freedoms is only incidental to the proper general purpose of the regula-
tions: restricting the dollar flow to hostile nations.
Id.; see Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to TWEA in denial of travel to Cuba); American Documentary Films, Inc.
v. Secretary of Treasury, 344 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting First Amend-
ment challenge to TWEA for denial of retroactive license because film distributor
would not divulge sources of Cuban film).
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suit of the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro.35 Pursuant
to TWEA, President Kennedy placed a trade embargo on Cuba
which continues in effect today.36 The Treasury Department,
which was designated to administer TWEA,37 delegated its au-
thority to OFAC,38 which in turn, promulgated the Cuban As-
sets Control Regulations (the "Regulations"). 9
The Regulations purport to stop the flow of hard currency
from the United States to Cuba.40 The Regulations prohibit
transactions involving any property of Cuba or its nationals ex-
35. See Proclamation 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962); see also Regan V. Wald, 468
U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (1984).
36. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 226. Diplomatic ties with Cuba had already been sev-
ered in the previous year. See DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1961, at 103-04. In 1977, Con-
gress amended section 5(b), making TWEA applicable only in times of war. Act of
Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 5 (1988)). The International Emergency Economic Powers Act [hereinafter
IEEPA] now governs peacetime emergencies. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988).
However, existing exercises of the President's "national emergency" authorities were
continued by a grandfather clause. See Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625
(1977). See generally Wald, 468 U.S. at 227-29; De Cuellar v. Brady, 881 F.2d 1561,
1563 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 245 (1989); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v.
Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). IEEPA does not authorize the
President to interfere with the international flow of mail or other communications.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1988).
37. Exec. Order No. 9193, 2 C.F.R. §§ 1174, 1175 (1942). The President dele-
gated his authority under TWEA to the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
38. Deleg. Order No. 128 (Rev..1) (Oct. 15, 1962)..
39. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1963) [hereinafter Regulations]; see, Capital Cities, 740 F.
Supp. at 1008.
40. Department of State Press Release 360, July 8, 1963, DEP'T. ST. BULL., July
1963, at 160. Three major purposes of TWEA and the Regulations are
(1) to deny to Cuba or its nationals hard currency which might be used to
promote activities inimical to the interests of the United States; (2) to retain
blocked funds for possible use or vesting to the United States should such a
decision be made; and (3) to use blocked funds for negotiation purposes in
discussions with the Cuban government.
Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted). Other pur-
poses, stressed by U.S. courts, are
(1) isolating Cuba,
(2) protecting Cubans from having their assets in the United States confis-
cated by Cuban authorities,
(3) preserving Cuban assets for future disposition,
(4) implementing of our economic defense program by
(a) denying Cuba access to dollar earnings and
(b) denying Cuba access to dollar financial facilities.
Carl F. Goodman, United States Government Foreign Property Controls, 52 GEO. L. J. 767,
793 (1964); see Real, 510 F.2d at 563 n.7; Cheng Yih-Chun v. Federal Reserve Bank,
442 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1971). In Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, the court stated
that -[h]ard Currency is a weapon in the struggle between the free and the commu-
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cept transactions undertaken pursuant to a general or specific
licensing provision.4 Willful violation of TWEA or its Regula-
tions is a felony.42
The Regulation's general licensing provision allows indi-
viduals to engage in authorized transactions without prior
OFAC approval.43 Authorized transactions involve the receipt
or transmission of mail,44 the transmission of television news
programming originating in Cuba by U.S. news organiza-
tions,45 and travel to Cuba for the purpose of gathering news,
making news or documentary films, or professional research.4 6
For other transactions, individuals must receive a specific
license from OFAC.4 7 OFAC grants specific licenses on a case-
by-case basis.48 Under the Regulations, however, OFAC does
not issue specific licenses for payment of television rights, ap-
pearance fees, royalties, pre-performance expenses, or other
similar payments resulting from any public exhibition or per-
formance in Cuba or the United States.4 9
2. Executive Authority Under the Berman Amendment
a. The Berman Amendment and TWEA Section 5(b)
In 1988, Congress amended section 5 of TWEA through
enactment of the Berman Amendment.50 The Berman
Amendment restricts presidential authority by retracting the
presidential power to regulate the import or export of infor-
mational materials. 5' The Berman Amendment, in pertinent
nist worlds." Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
41. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1991); see, e.g., Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1981); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
42. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1988). The resulting punishment for a willful violation
of TWEA and the Regulations may be imprisonment for up to ten years and/or a fine
of up to US$50,000. Id.
43. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.542, 515.560 (1991).
44. Id. § 515.542(a).
45. Id. § 515.542(b).
46. Id. § 515.560(a)(1)(ii).
47. Id. § 515.801(b).
48. See, e.g., id. §§ 515.542(c), 515.560(b), 515.565(b).
49. Id. § 515.565(c)(1).
50. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988)).
51. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (1988).
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part, provides that
[t]he authority granted to the President in this subsection
does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, di-
rectly or indirectly, the importation or the exportation
. . . whether commercial or otherwise, of publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, micro-
films, microfiche, tapes, or other informational materials, which
are not otherwise controlled for export under section 5 of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 ... or with respect
to which no acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18,
United States Code.52
This restriction of presidential authority represents a reaction
to several seizures at the U.S. border of shipments of
magazines and books from embargoed countries.53
The legislative history of the Berman Amendment empha-
sizes the importance of the free flow of ideas and informa-
tion.54 The legislative history stresses that the U.S. govern-
ment should not prohibit the import of informational materials
protected by the First Amendment. 55 The legislative history
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Bor-
der and The Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM & MARY L. REV. 719, 731 n.52 (1985). The letter
sent to those affected by such enforcement stated that
[y]ou are the addressee of a mail shipment containing publications from
Cuba. This mail has been detained by the United States Customs Service
because its unlicensed importation is prohibited by the Cuban Assets Con-
trol Regulations (31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
This office may not release this merchandise to you unless you present
to us, together with this notice, either in person or by mail a Foreign Assets
Control License.
Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 113 (1987) [hereinafter
HousE REPORT]. The Berman Amendment, not itself the subject of legislative de-
bate, specifically provides that the legislative history of its predecessor bill be treated
as its own. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107, 1119 (1988); see Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1547-48
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
55. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 113. The Berman Amendment's legislative
history encompasses the Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, which accompanied the predecessor bill. Id. The House Report
noted the American Bar Association House of Delegates' resolution that stressed the
importance of no barriers in the importation of informational materials. Id. The
House Report merely noted the American Bar Association House of Delegates' reso-
lution that stated that "no prohibitions should exist on imports to the United States
of ideas and information if their circulation is protected by the First Amendment."
Id.
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also includes concern that the Berman Amendment allow a
free flow of ideas across international borders.56
The House Report to the Berman Amendment also noted
an intent to codify within the Berman Amendment the trade
practices under the Libyan and Nicaraguan embargoes 7.5  Both
the Libyan and the Nicaraguan regulations contain language
similar to the Berman Amendment.58 Both the Libyan and
Nicaraguan embargoes, however, contain separate provisions
authorizing the import of telecommunications.5 9
b. The Berman Amendment and the Regulations
OFAC subsequently amended its Regulations to reflect
changes made by the Berman Amendment. 60 The amended
Regulations made several key alterations to the general and
specific licensing provisions.6' OFAC retained the authority to
56. See 132 CONG. REC. 6550, 6551 (1986). Senator Mathias of Maryland, the
sponsor of the predecessor bill identical in pertinent part to the Berman Amend-
ment, also stated its intent to allow a free flow of information. Id. Senator Mathias
stated that the bill's intent is to remove "barriers that inhibit the free exchange of
ideas across international frontiers." Id. at 6550. In addition, he stated that
"[t]oday's telecommunications media can bring into our living rooms the images and
voices of exponents of every political and artistic tendency around the globe. To
deny... information entry or exit not only injures our freedom but insults the intelli-
gence of the American people." Id. at 6551. Senator Mathias also stated that abstract
ideals contained in the First Amendment are "articulated in tangible forms." Id. at
6550.
Indeed, after the enactment of the Berman Amendment and the Regulations, the
sponsor of the Berman Amendment wrote that telecommunications, contrary to the
Regulations, should be included in any definition of "informational materials" to
avoid illogical results inconsistent with its intent. See Brief of Amici Curiae, CBS, Inc.
and the National Broadcasting Company, Inc. at Ex. A, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v.
Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90-6200).
57. HousE REPORT, supra note 54, at 113. The House Report stated that "[the
Berman Amendment] codiflies] current practice ... in the recent embargoes of trade
with Nicaragua and Libya of exempting information materials and publications from
import restrictions." Id.
58. 31 C.F.R. § 540.536 (1991) (Nicaragua) (authorizing importation of "publi-
cations, including books, newspapers, magazines, films, phonograph records, tape
recordings, photographs, microfilm, microfiche, posters and similar materials"); id.
§ 550.201 (Libya) (authorizing "publications and materials imported for news publi-
cation or news broadcast dissemination"). But see id. § 540.535 (Nicaragua) (author-
izing importation of services in connection with "conference, performance, exhibi-
tion or similar event"); id. §§ 550.502, 550.504 (Libya) (authorizing export of "tech-
nical data" under specific circumstances).
59. Id. § 540.542 (Nicaragua); id. § 550.510 (Libya).
60. 54 Fed. Reg. 5229, 5231 (1989).
61. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.206(a), 515.545(b) (1991).
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grant specific licenses on a case-by-case basis,62 but expanded
the general licensing provisions to include transactions involv-
ing other "informational materials."6 OFAC thus enabled
parties dealing with Cuban informational materials to proceed
without OFAC prior approval.'
The Regulations narrowly define other "informational
materials.''65 The Regulations qualify other "informational
materials" as items in tangible form, excluding intangible in-
formational materials such as telecommunication transmis-
sions.66 In addition, the Regulations prohibit transactions in-
volving other "informational materials", not yet in existence at
the time of the transaction, such as commissioning a book to
be written or the payment of royalties for such works.67
3. Deference to Decisions of Administrative Agencies
The decisions of executive agencies such as OFAC receive
great deference from the judiciary.6 s Courts often determine
administrative agencies to be better situated than courts to
make decisions concerning statutes that they administer be-
cause of their specialized knowledge of the technical aspects of
the statute.69 Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
courts must recognize the spheres of power given each branch
62. See, e.g., id. §§ 515.542(c), 515.560(b), 515.565(b).
63. Id. §§ 515.206(a), 515.545(b).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 515.332(b). The Regulations define "informational materials" to ex-
clude "intangible items such as telecommunication transmissions." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. §§ 515.206(c), 515.545(b). The Regulations prohibit "transactions re-
lated to informational materials not fully created and in existence at the date of the
transaction," as well as the "remittance of royalties or other payments relating to
works not yet in being." Id.
68. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (deferring to Environmental Protection Agency's defini-
tion of "statutory source" in Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
69. Id.; see, e.g., Public Citizen v; Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988) (deferring to administrative agency decision as to
whether de minimis exception to statutory ban on use of carcinogens as food additives
should exist). But see Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 60 U.S.L.W. 4145 (1992) (refusing to
defer to administrative agency's decision); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n.
v. Arabian American Oil Co., I1I S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (stating administrative agency's
decision not entitled to deference); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)
(refusing to defer to agency where Court could ascertain congressional intent on
precise question).
8191991-1992]
820 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:808
of government. 70 Accordingly, courts defer to agencies be-
cause they are considered to be indirectly accountable to the
people, through the executive's direct accountability, for pol-
icy choices such as the choice between First Amendment free-
doms and foreign policy goals. 7' Courts may also defer to ad-
ministrative agencies when they believe that Congress has im-
plicitly left gaps for the agency to fill. 72
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. ,T7 the Supreme Court developed a high standard for defer-
ence to administrative agencies. 4 In Chevron, the Supreme
Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's con-
struction of the term "statutory source" in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. 7 ' The Court decided that it must defer
to an agency interpretation unless Congress addressed the
precise issue at hand in either the plain language of the statute
or in clear legislative history.76 According to the Chevron
Court, if Congress failed to address the issue, a court must de-
fer to the agency's reasonable interpretation.7 7
Although entitled to substantial deference, administrative
70. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. The structure of the articles in the U.S.
Constitution reflects the concept of separation of powers by the delegation of distinct
powers to each branch of government. U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1.
71. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
72. See, e.g., id. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). In
Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that
"[tlhe power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.
Id. (quoting Morton, 415 U.S. at 231).
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 866; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1977)).
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
77. Id. The Chevron Court stated that
[flirst, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear ... the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. If, however.., the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's an-
swer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
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agencies' decisions are not insulated from judicial review.78
The courts will reverse agency decisions if those decisions are
determined to be arbitrary and capricious. 71 Courts also over-
rule administrative agency decisions that are inconsistent with
statutory authority or that frustrate congressional policy. 80 Fi-
nally, courts do not defer to decisions of administrative agen-
cies that interpret statutes inconsistently with previous agency
decisions.8 '
II. APPROACHES ADOPTED BY COURTS IN
DETERMINING THE MEANING OF
"INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS" IN THE
BERMAN AMENDMENT
Currently, two lower federal courts disagree with respect
to the proper interpretation of the phrase "informational
materials" in the Berman Amendment and its Regulations.82
Deferring to an OFAC decision, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v.
Brady83 interpreted the Berman Amendment narrowly to ex-
empt strictly tangible forms of information from the scope of
the Regulations. In contrast, the District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida in Cernuda v. Heavey84 interpreted the
Berman Amendment broadly to protect all ideas and informa-
78. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981).
79. See, e.g., De Cuellar v. Brady, 881 F.2d 1561, 1565 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 245 (1989); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)
(stating that "reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
80. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n, 454 U.S. at 37.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396 (1956) (refusing
to defer to administrative agency's statutory interpretation because of prior, long-
standing, consistent and contrary interpretation). But see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct.
1759 (1991). The Supreme Court in Rust affirmed a decision by the Department of
Health and Human Services regarding advice to clients about abortions. Id. The
Court rejected the argument that such decisions should not be given deference be-
cause it represents a sharp break from previous decisions on the basis of the agency's
reasoning that the agency must be given ample latitude. Id. at 1769.
82. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
83. 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
84. 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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tion exported from Cuba to the United States if such ideas and
information are protected by the First Amendment.
A. The Capital Cities Approach
1. Factual Background and OFAC's Decision
In Capital Cities, the Southern District of New York de-
ferred to OFAC's decision that found that the proposed trans-
action, involving the live broadcast of the Pan American
Games in the United States, would violate TWEA.85 In Octo-
ber 1988, Capital Cities successfully placed a bid with the Pan
American Sports Organization ("PASO")8 6 for the exclusive
right to televise the 1991 Pan American Games, which were to
be held in Havana, Cuba.87 For the right to televise the games
live, Capital Cities agreed to pay US$8.7 million to PASO with
the express understanding that 75 percent would be remitted
to the host organizer of the game, Cimesports, S.A., a Cuban
entity.88 OFAC informed Capital Cities that the proposed
transaction required a specific license pursuant to TWEA and
the Regulations.89 OFAC would approve the license only if
royalty payments were made to a blocked account90 and if
travel expenses were minimal. 9' OFAC also informed the
plaintiff that a news-gathering general license would be avail-
able if no royalty payments were made and certain guidelines
were followed.92 In addition, OFAC stated that the plaintiff
could import videotapes of the games on a conditional basis. 93
85. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1013.
86. Id. at 1009. The Pan American Sports Organization [hereinafter PASO] is
an international organization headquartered in Mexico. Id.
87. Id. The Pan American Games are a multidisciplinary sports competition
held every four years in a different member nation. Id.
88. Id. at 1009-10.
89. Id. at 1010. Capital Cities subsequently retracted and renewed its specific
license application. Id.
90. Id.; see 31 C.F.R. § 515.508(a) (1991) (authorizing payments to blocked ac-
counts).
91. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
92. Id: (citing Notice of Motion at Ex. 5). OFAC guidelines required that Capital
Cities' activities "essentially consist of reports or documentaries of, or information
about, the Games and related events accessible to the press on a non-exclusive ba-
sis." Id. at 1010 n.5 (citing Notice of Motion at Ex. 5).
93. Id. at 1010. The videotapes could be imported if plaintiff did not "fund, or
provide or contract for services in connection with, the production of the tapes." Id.
(quoting Notice of Motion at Ex. 5).
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OFAC denied plaintiff's application for a specific license,
however, because the transaction involved would result in a
substantial payment of funds to Cuba.94 Plaintiff, unable to
abide by OFAC's specific license guidelines, filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Berman Amendment and the
Constitution authorized the proposed transaction.95
2. Opinion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York
Deferring to OFAC's decision, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Capital Cities followed the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court in Chevron.9 6 The court deferred
to OFAC's decision because neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history of the Berman Amendment clearly speci-
fied the meaning of "informational materials. 97 The court
also rejected the plaintiff's First Amendment arguments, citing
the existence of a lower standard of judicial scrutiny for mat-
ters implicating foreign affairs. 98
a. Statutory Construction and Legislative History
In Capital Cities, the district court concluded that the word
"materials" in the phrase "other informational materials" was
subject to interpretation because it may refer to both tangible
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, a court must defer to an agency inter-
pretation unless Congress has addressed the precise issue at hand in either the plain
language of the statute or in clear legislative history. Id. at 842-43; see supra text
accompanying notes 73-81 (discussing Chevron's deference standard). The Court in
Chevron stated that a "court need not conclude that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question had initially arisen in a judicial
proceeding." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
97. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
98. Id. at 1012-13. Capital Cities sought
a declaratory judgment that the Berman Amendment and/or the Constitu-
tion authorizes the transaction proposed by ABC; that the Regulations are
null and void to the extent that they regulate the importation of television
signals and related informational materials; and that the Berman Amend-
ment, the Administrative Procedures Act and/or the United States Constitu-
tion bar the Government from initiating any proceeding against ABC to pro-
hibit ABC from televising the 1991 Games.
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted). The case was not appealed and has since been settled.
Webster, Treasury, ABC Sports Settle Suit, Proprietary to the United Press International,
Dec. 13, 1990, Washington News Section.
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and intangible items.99 In the statute, the term "informational
materials" follows a list of tangible informational materials
such as books and magazines.100 The court considered the
rule of statutory construction that general words following a
specific list should be given a meaning similar to the specific
list.'"' According to the court, application of this rule to the
Berman Amendment was inconclusive because the general
phrase "other informational materials" is set off by the dis-
junctive word "or," possibly indicating an intent to broaden
the preceding class. 10 2 The court found persuasive the argu-
ment that when Congress intends to include intangibles such
as telecommunications, it does so clearly.10 3
The court also noted that the legislative history failed to
clarify the definition of "other informational materials."' 10 4
The court found that at best there existed a general purpose to
allow a free flow of ideas and information, but it could find no
definition of "informational materials" or any distinction be-
tween tangible and intangible informational materials.'0 5 A
99. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1011. For a view disagreeing with the court,
see A. Sanford, Foreign Affairs and First Amendment Rights: Office of Foreign Assets Control
Prohibits ABC's Pan American Games Broadcast, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177, 181
(1991).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4) (1988).
101. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1011 (citing Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494
U.S. 26 (1990)). The principle referred to is ejusdem generis. See Garcia v. United
States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 (1984) (discussing rule that general words following specific
words in statute encompass objects only similar in nature to those enumerated); 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992).
The principle of statutory construction ejusdem generis has been defined as "[w]here
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words
are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
by the preceding specific words." Id. This principle has been called "a common
drafting technique designed to save the legislature from spelling out in advance every
contingency in which the statute could apply." Id.
102. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978); United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90 (1975)); see supra text accompanying note 52 (citing Berman
Amendment).
103. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1011 n.8. The court pointed to 47 U.S.C.
§ 397(14) (1982) in which Congress included intangibles in the meaning of "infor-
mational material" when it included the phrase "informational materials that may be
transmitted by means of electronic communications." Id. (citing Wire or Radio Com-
munications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 397(14) (1982)). In addition, Congress does not refer
to telecommunications as informational materials. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 522(2) (1988)
(referring to "television broadcast signals").
104. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1011.
105. Id. The American Bar Association House of Delegates' resolution was not
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comparison with the situations involving the Nicaraguan and
Libyan embargoes proved to be of no avail because they failed
to address agreements for exclusive broadcast rights and be-
cause they contain exclusions similar to those of the Regula-
tions. 1° 6 Because the statutory language and the legislative
history failed to clarify the meaning of "other informational
materials," the court held that deference to OFAC was de-
manded unless precluded by the First Amendment. 0 7
b. First Amendment Challenge
The court in Capital Cities rejected plaintiff's First Amend-
ment challenge to the validity of OFAC's prohibition of pay-
ment for intangible information. The court found that, in the
area of foreign affairs, congressional or executive power is not
subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny and limitations
that the First Amendment demands in a domestic context.'0 8
Finding the rule inapplicable in foreign affairs, the court dis-
missed the rule of statutory construction that a court should
construe a statute to avoid raising serious constitutional
problems.' 0 9 To construe the statute otherwise, the court
dispositive because Congress only noted the resolution, which was included within
the legislative history, without accepting or rejecting it. See supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text (discussing American Bar Association resolution). Also, no defi-
nition of "informational materials" was given in the resolution. Capital Cities, 740 F.
Supp. at 1012 n.9. Senator Mathias's statements also lacked the desired definition.
Id.; see supra note 56. In addition, Senator Berman's statements that Congress in-
tended to include telecommunications in the Berman Amendment were given little if
any weight because they were made after the enactment of the statute and elicited in
light of this case. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1012 n.9 (citing County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 n.16 (1981)).
106. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1012.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 (1969)). Teague upheld the constitutionality of a total
prohibition of importation of all informational materials from China and North Viet-
nam. Teague, 404 F.2d at 446. Factors considered in the application of the First
Amendment in a domestic context are "the nature of the regulation imposed, the
type of speech at issue, the context in which the regulation arises, and the purpose
for which the regulation is imposed." Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F.
Supp. 1007, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 790 (1989); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969); Teague,
404 F.2d at 446)).
109. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1013; see EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988) (refusing to
defer to NLRB's interpretation to avoid raising constitutional issues); see also NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 507 (1979) (refusing to bring
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held, would raise constitutional issues of separation of powers
and the authority of the executive in foreign affairs."10 The
court advised the use of extreme care in balancing First
Amendment issues raised by deference to OFAC with a separa-
tion of powers issue raised by any judicial limitation on execu-
tive authority in foreign affairs."'
The Capital Cities court also rejected First Amendment ar-
guments relating to form and content. ' 2 The court failed to
find discrimination between print and broadcast media be-
cause both forms of media have the right to obtain the Pan
American Games in tangible form, such as videotapes." ' In
addition, the court found no content-based discrimination be-
cause OFAC's decision was based upon the payment for the
telecommunications, not the subject matter of the telecommu-
nications." 4 The Capital Cities court thus concluded that the
Berman Amendment, as construed by OFAC, presented no
First Amendment problems that required a result other than
deference to the agency's decision.' t'
B. The Cernuda Approach
1. Factual Background and OFAC's Decision
Cernuda involved the pre-indictment seizure of 200 paint-
ings allegedly imported in violation of TWEA and the Regula-
teachers of church-operated schools within the NLRB's jurisdiction in order to avoid
constitutional problems of separation of church and state).
110. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1013.
111. Id. The court in Capital Cities stated that a "[c]ourt must ... be careful to
balance the First Amendment constitutional issues that could arise from deference to
the agency's interpretation against those constitutional issues which may arise if in-
sufficient latitude is given to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1013-14 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 787
(1989)). The Supreme Court in Ward found that regulations are content-neutral if
the message conveyed is not considered by the government and the regulations serve
a purpose unrelated to suppression of speech. Id. Yet the Court in Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co. struck down an ordinance giving the mayor unbridled discretion
to grant or deny permits for placement of newspaper racks on public property be-
cause there was substantial danger that content-based discrimination would occur.
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988). The court in
Capital Cities found Plain Dealer inapplicable because there was no showing of discrimi-
nation. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
115. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1013.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY
tions. "'6 The plaintiff, Ram6n Cernuda, the director of the Cu-
ban Museum in Miami, sought the return of the seized paint-
ings." 7  Ram6n Cernuda did not personally "trade with the
enemy,"' 18 but rather attempted to obtain a license from
OFAC to exhibit the Cuban paintings at issue." 9 Although
OFAC never responded specifically to Mr. Cernuda's applica-
tion, an OFAC official wrote that the amended TWEA does not
exempt art-work from the scope of the applicable regula-
tion. ' 20
Political turmoil surrounded the controversy in this
case.' 2 ' The controversy arose because the exhibition in-
cluded works of art created by artists living in Cuba and by
those who had not renounced allegiance to the Communist re-
gime.' 22 The Cuban Museum and the Cuban American Na-
tional Foundation possessed drastically different views of Cuba
that erupted in violence.12 3 Involved were death threats, a car
bomb, and numerous protest rallies. 24
2. Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida
In Cernuda, the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida emphasized the statutory language of the Berman
Amendment and its legislative history and concluded that reg-
ulation of ideas and information lies outside the authority of
116. Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
117. Id. at 1545. Rule 4 1(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives
courts "discretion to hear pre-indictment requests for the return of unconstitution-
ally seized property." Id. at 1546 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at n.4.
119. Id. at 1546. The plaintiff sought both a license and a retroactive license.
Id. The only response to the request for a retroactive license was OFAC's director
making a speech to critics of Mr. Cernuda and the Cuban Museum in which he
pledged to work with those who opposed the museum's activities. Id. at 1552.
120. Id. at 1551 (citing Government's Memorandum at 9, app. at 20).
121. Id. at 1545.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Cuban Museum was intended to be "a forum in which Cuban cul-
ture could be shared with the community at large." Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Cernuda v.
Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (No. 89-2613). The Cuban American
National Foundation is an ultra-conservative group politically opposed to Fidel Cas-
tro. Id. at 6-7.
124. Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Outside a
benefit auction, protestors shouted insults and political slurs demonstrating against
the display of Marxist-Leninist propaganda. Brief for Plaintiff at 7, Cernuda (No. 89-
2613).
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the executive. 25 The court interpreted the legislative history
of the Berman Amendment to find the absence of any congres-
sional prohibition on the free flow of ideas and information
that are protected by the First Amendment.' 26 Although ac-
knowledging the importance of deference to agencies charged
with administering a statute, the court found the OFAC inter-
pretation both arbitrary and capricious, and ruled in favor of
the plaintiff to release the paintings at issue as exempt from
regulation under TWEA.'2 7
a. Statutory Construction and Legislative History
The Cernuda court found that original paintings qualify as
"informational materials" under the Berman Amendment to
TWEA.' 28 The court decided that paintings were informa-
tional, as demonstrated by the community's conflicting reac-
tions to the possibility of their exhibition. 29 The court also
quoted passages from art history books praising the informa-
tional qualities of art.' 3 0
Examining congressional intent, the court held that infor-
mational materials should be exempt from regulation to avoid
violation of the First Amendment.' 3 ' The court cited the
House Report as indicative of congressional intent to exempt
from regulation all materials protected by the First Amend-
ment.13 2 Although recognizing that the House Report did not
125. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1550 n.10.
126. Id. at 1549.
127. Id. at 1552.
128. Id. at 1553.
129. Id. at 1551.
130. Id. The court reiterated the artwork's informational value when it stated
that:
"[g]reat works of art are more than aesthetically pleasing objects, more than
feats of human skills and ingenuity: they deepen our insight into ourselves
and others, they sharpen our awareness of our own and other religious be-
liefs, they enlarge our comprehension of alternative and often alien ways of
life-in short they help us to explore and understand our own human na-
ture."
Id. (quoting H. HONOUR & J. FLEMING, THE VISUAL ARTS: A HISTORY 15 (2d ed.
1986)).
131. Id. at 1553.
132. Id. at 1549. The court in Cernuda stated that
[i]n explaining the [Berman Amendment], the House Foreign Affairs com-
mittee expressly noted that the American Bar Association House of Dele-
gates, the ABA's representative body, had approved "the principle that no
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explicitly accept a resolution to exempt from regulation all
First Amendment materials, the court inferred it to be congres-
sional intent from the plain language of the Report. 33
b. First Amendment Challenge
Although it based its decision on statutory construction
and congressional intent, the Cernuda court discussed the First
Amendment implicitly.3 4 The Cernuda court noted that the
First Amendment protects art. 35 The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that OFAC Regulations have an incidental
effect on First Amendment concerns, and that this incidental
impact is justified by the important governmental interest in
limiting the flow of U.S. currency to Cuba.1 6 The court ex-
amined the legislative history and the phrase "informational
materials" in the Berman Amendment. 3 7 Distinguishing au-
thority cited by the government, the court concluded that the
Berman Amendment exempts from the scope of regulation
prohibitions should exist on imports to the United States of ideas and infor-
mation if their circulation is protected by the First Amendment."
Id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 113).
133. Id. at 1549-50. In response to the argument that the resolution was not
expressly accepted, the Cernuda court stated that "[t]he government offers no support
for this argument, which seems to ignore the plain language of the report and the
obvious First Amendment orientation of the words 'informational materials.' " Id. at
1550.
134. Id. at 1549-50.
135. Id. at 1549. The court concluded that "[a]rtwork... is within the ambit of
speech that receives First Amendment protection." Id. (citing Serra v. United States
Gen. Serv. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1048 (2d Cir. 1988); Piarowski v. Illinois Commu-
nity College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007
(1985)).
136. Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1989). This
standard was established by United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (up-
holding law prohibiting burning of draft cards during Vietnam War because of suffi-
ciently important governmental interest). See supra text accompanying notes 21-23
(discussing O'Brien standard). The government further argued that economic regula-
tion has been established as a sufficiently important governmental reason. Cernuda,
720 F. Supp. at 1549 n. 10 (citations omitted). The court in Cernuda distinguished this
case from Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs and American Documentary Films, Inc.
v. Secretary of Treasury, stating that " [t ]he courts rendering those decisions emphasized
that the regulations involved made limited incursions on First Amendment activity
and thus the restrictions involved were truly incidental." Id. at 1549-50 n.10.
137. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1549-50, 1553. The court rejected the argument
that Congress did not explicitly accept the ABA resolution. Id. Similarly, the canon
of ejusdem generis was discarded because it must be applied according to the statute's
purpose viewed in light of its legislative intent. Id. at 1550 n. 12.
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ideas and information that are protected by the First Amend-
ment. 38  The court concluded that Congress must have in-
tended to exempt all informational materials from presidential
control in order to prevent the statute from violating the First
Amendment. 3 9
c. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
The court found OFAC's decision in refusing to include
paintings within the definition of "other informational materi-
als" and refusing to respond to plaintiff's specific license appli-
cations to be arbitrary and capricious and thus reversed it, al-
lowing the plaintiff to recover the seized paintings.'4 ° The
court based its reversal on three factors.' 4' First, it stated that
OFAC failed to consider whether the general term "informa-
tional materials" included artwork.' 42 Second, it reasoned that
the Regulations require a more generous reading than OFAC
gave them in this case because the Regulation's list of what
138. Id. at n.10. The court reasoned that the Berman Amendment "totally ex-
empts from prohibition or regulation the import of ideas and information protected
by the First Amendment." Id. Yet the court limited its holding such that only paint-
ings are exempt from regulation under TWEA; art itself was not decisively exempt
from TWEA. d. at 1553 n.15. The court in Cernuda stated that "[aidmittedly, the
general term 'informational materials' may be construed to exempt other items be-
sides paintings from the TWEA .... However, this petition presents only the ques-
tion of whether paintings are exempt from the TWEA. No occasion exists to decide
whether other art falls within the rubric of 'informational materials.' " d.
139. Id. at 1553. The court believed that it avoided constitutional questions,
thereby remaining consistent with the principle embodied in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979), that a court should construe a statute
to avoid raising constitutional issues. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see
also Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1553. The Cernuda court held that
statutory construction and the legislative history of the 1988 TWEA amend-
ment show that Congress amended the TWEA to exempt "informational
materials," in order to prevent the statute from running afoul of the First
Amendment. Original paintings fall within the statutory exemption. This
construction avoids serious questions about the constitutionality of the
TWEA.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
140. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1551. The standard of review applied by the court
is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
Note that the court did not use or discuss the method of a court's analysis in review-
ing an agency's decision that was established in Chevron. See Cernuda, 720 F. Supp.
1544.
141. Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1551-52 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
142. Id. at 1551. OFAC stated that it would not include artwork in any interpre-
tation of "publication." Id.
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constitutes informational materials is merely exemplary, not
exclusionary. 43 Third, the court found that OFAC's inaction
with regard to Mr. Cernuda's license applications was unrea-
sonable. 4 4 For these three reasons, the court held OFAC's
decision to be arbitrary and capricious and thus found the
paintings to be exempt from regulation under TWEA.' 45
III. U.S. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO OFAC'S DECISIONS
REGARDING THE PHRASE "OTHER
INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS"
The judiciary should defer to OFAC's definition of the
phrase "other informational materials" and thereby allow
presidential regulation of intangible informational materials
under TWEA.' 4 6 When an agency considers congressional in-
tent and previous agency decisions to determine the proper in-
terpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, reviewing
courts should defer to the agency's decision to avoid an issue
of separation of powers. 47 In addition, TWEA's overall pur-
.pose of preventing the flow of hard currency to Cuba, in con-
junction with its statutory language and legislative history, sug-
gests courts should defer to the decisions of OFAC. Such def-
erence does not raise First Amendment problems because any
resulting restriction of First Amendment expression is inciden-
tal to the pursuit of an important governmental interest that
implicates the foreign affairs authority of the executive branch.
Moreover, as a result of these factors, the Cernuda court's inter-
pretation of the phrase "other informational materials" to in-
clude all informational materials is overly broad in reaching
beyond the facts of that case.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1552; see supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing OFAC's inac-
tion to plaintiff's application).
145. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1552.
146. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Although the holding in Capital Cities deferred to OFAC's decision limiting "other
informational materials" to include only tangible informational materials, the court
in Cernuda referred in dicta to "other informational materials" as including all infor-
mational materials protected by the First Amendment. Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F.
Supp. 1544, 1550 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
147. Previous OFAC decisions occurred prior to the Berman Amendment.
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A. Separation of Powers Demands Deference
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers, U.S.
courts generally defer to executive authority in the area of for-
eign affairs.' 48 The U.S. Constitution delegates foreign affairs
policy to the executive."' 9 In addition, the judiciary often lacks
the necessary understanding of technical executive decisions
or diplomatic compromises. 5 0
OFAC, as an administrative body, is uniquely situated and
was specifically created to administer TWEA, and possesses a
specialized knowledge of U.S.-Cuban relations.' 5' The courts
would infringe executive authority specifically delegated by
Congress if the judiciary usurped the power of a technically
oriented agency. 5 2 The judiciary must oversee only agency
abuse and consistent application of the statute. 53
The courts in Capital Cities and Cernuda both acknowledged
the separation of powers doctrine and the importance of defer-
148. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 292 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Chicago & S. Air Lines Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see supra note 26 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing executive authority in foreign affairs).
149. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the
nation's military forces and may make treaties with other nations as well as appoint
ambassadors subject to the Senate's approval. Id. It has also been claimed that the
Constitution implicitly authorizes presidential power to conduct foreign relations.
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304; see alo BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 178 (1991). The court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer stated that
"[the President's power, if any, to issue the order [the seizure of steel plants] must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). Critics have commented that
the President's power fluctuates with the strength of the particular President and that
[n]o complete answers can be found in the text of the Constitution to the
burning questions of the extent of presidential power in foreign affairs or
the proper roles of Congress and the President in those areas where their
powers overlap. Those questions are often resolved in the political process,
without the benefit of much judicial intervention.
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra, at 179-80.
150. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing specific knowledge of
agencies).
151. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1991).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 68-81 (discussing deference to agency
decisions).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77 (discussing standard of deference
to administrative agency).
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ence to administrative agency decisions.' 54 The Capital Cities
court correctly balanced the separation of powers issue with
the First Amendment issue and found that deference was man-
dated. 55 The Cernuda court should have decided the case
without raising a separation of powers issue by examining ex-
clusively the informational and tangible nature of paintings.
56
By examining the nature of the paintings, the court would not
have infringed upon OFAC's rightful authority to refine am-
biguous statutory language.157
B. TWEA's Purpose, Statutory Language, and Legislative History
Mandate Judicial Deference
OFAC's definition of informational materials, excluding
intangibles such as telecommunications, is consistent with the
purpose of TWEA and the Regulations. 58 In blocking the
flow of U.S. currency to Cuba, Congress exempted from regu-
lation only those items of limited economic significance such as
books, magazines, and newspapers.' 59 Allowing the import of
items such as books and magazines is consistent with the
Berman Amendment's general notion of allowing a free flow of
information. 6 °  To allow telecommunications of compara-
tively large economic significance to go unregulated would re-
sult in millions of U.S. dollars pouring into the Cuban econ-
omy, contrary to the purpose of TWEA.' 6 '
The statutory language fails to specify clearly the meaning
of the phrase "other informational materials," thereby prop-
154. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1551-52 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
155. Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. at 1013.
156. See Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1550-51.
157. Id. at 1550 n.10.
158. See Capital Cities, 740 F. Supp. 1007; see supra notes 31-32, 40 and accompa-
nying text (discussing purpose of TWEA and Regulations).
159. See Brief for Defendant at 26-27, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F.
Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90-6200).
160. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing Berman Amend-
ment's general notion of allowing free flow of information). The Berman Amend-
ment represents a reaction to the seizure of such items at the U.S. border. See supra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing seizure at border of books and
magazines pursuant to TWEA).
161. See Brief for Defendant at 26-27, Capital Cities (No. 90-6200). At the time of
the Capital Cities litigation, there were US$47.5 million in blocked accounts as a result
of telecommunications which could have been released as a consequence of a con-
trary decision in the case. Id. at 37 n.17.
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erly leaving its interpretation to OFAC. 162 Both district courts
in Capital Cities and Cernuda found the statutory language am-
biguous. 16 3 Congress may have intentionally left a "gap," the
definition of informational materials, for OFAC to fill.' 64 In-
deed, when Congress wishes to include intangible forms of in-
formation within this phrase, it does so clearly.'
65
The legislative history of the Berman Amendment con-
tains no definition of the phrase "other informational materi-
als."' 66 The legislative history does stress, however, the im-
portance of the free flow of ideas and information.
67
Although both Capital Cities and Cernuda acknowledged that
Congress never explicitly accepted or rejected this notion, 68
this does not lead to a conclusive understanding of the phrase
"informational materials."
162. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103 (discussing ambiguous statutory
language of Berman Amendment).
163. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1550-51 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
164. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing gaps left by Congress
for agencies).
165. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing instances when Con-
gress includes intangible informational materials within statutes).
The doctrine established by the Court in United States v. Midwest Oil Co. that
"long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent" may not
apply to these cases because there is not a long-standing practice of not including
telecommunications within the definition of informational materials. See United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Youngstown stated that congressional acquiescence may lead to independ-
ent presidential power:
[When] the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsi-
bility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imper-
atives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59 (discussing legislative history of
Berman Amendment).
167. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing general notion of
flow of information in legislative history of Berman Amendment).
168. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1011-12 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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The legislative history also reveals congressional intent to
codify current trade practice involving Libya and Nicaragua. 1
69
This congressional intent, acknowledged in Capital Cities and
Cernuda, does not lead to a conclusive definition of "other in-
formational materials" because both the Libyan and Nicara-
guan regulations contain explicit and separate provisions relat-
ing to television which were not incorporated in the Berman
Amendment. 70 Because neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history furnishes a clear meaning of "informa-
tional materials," the Chevron standard mandates deference to
an agency's interpretation unless a constitutional problem ex-
ists. 171
The Berman Amendment was not intended or designed to
be a major loophole in the President's authority in foreign af-
fairs.1 72  Excluding the grandfathered embargo programs,
TWEA applies to other countries only in times of war.17 3 To
allow deregulation of telecommunications in wartime would
entail serious ramifications for the effectiveness and flexibility
of the executive in foreign affairs. '
74
C. First Amendment Problems Are Not Raised
OFAC's refusal to allow payment for telecommunication
coverage to Cuba in Capital Cities passes the O'Brien test and
thus does not violate the First Amendment. In United States v.
O'Brien, the Supreme Court established a test for the validity
of domestic regulations affecting First Amendment speech.
75
When speech and non-speech elements are combined, an im-
portant governmental interest in regulating the non-speech el-
ement of the conduct may justify an incidental restriction of
free speech.' 76 This governmental restriction on speech is per-
169. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing House Report).
170. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 540.536, 540.542, 550.510 (1991).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77 (discussing Chevron's deference
test); see infra text accompanying notes 175-87 (arguing that no First Amendment
problem exists).
172. See Brief for Defendant at 13, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F.
Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90-6200).
173. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988).
174. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing need for presidential
flexibility in foreign affairs).
175. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
176. Id.
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mitted if it is within the government's constitutional power,
furthers an important governmental interest, is unrelated to
the suppression of speech, and is no more restrictive than nec-
essary to further that interest. 77
The O'Brien test is applicable to OFAC's regulation of pay-
ment for telecommunication rights because the Regulations
control telecommunications and related payments to Cuba, a
situation that includes both speech and non-speech ele-
ments. 78 In Teague, the restriction of the flow of U.S. currency
to designated countries was found to be a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest to pass constitutional muster under
a First Amendment challenge. 79 The government properly
controls the flow of currency to Cuba in light of executive
power under TWEA and the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent in foreign affairs.' 80 When OFAC refused to allow the
payment for the telecommunication transmission in Capital Cit-
ies, it followed its stated goal of preventing U.S. currency from
flowing to Cuba.' 8  Such restriction is no greater than neces-
sary given OFAC's willingness to allow the transmission if no
royalty fees were paid to Cuban nationals. 8 2 Any restriction
on the First Amendment is therefore incidental to the pursuit
of a sufficiently important governmental interest. 83
The O'Brien test is a strict test originally applied in a do-
mestic context." 4 By meeting the standards set by this strict
domestic test, the actions by OFAC in Capital Cities are certainly
justified in the area of foreign affairs.'8 5 Although speech ex-
pressed through both television and artwork is constitutionally
protected by the First Amendment, such protections are less
177. Id.; see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing O'Brien's re-
quirements).
178. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.565 (1991).
179. See Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441, 445-46 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 977 (1969).
180. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing power of executive).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing OFAC's denial of
licenses in pursuit of stated goal).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (discussing OFAC conditions to
transaction).
183. See Teague, 404 F.2d at 445.
184. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text (setting forth O'Brien test).
185. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing lessening of Con-
stitutional protections in foreign affairs).
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expansive in the area of foreign affairs than they would be in a
domestic context. 8 6 The extent of foreign policy concerns
that were implicated in both Capital Cities and Cernuda are such
that governmental restrictions pursuant to TWEA both should
have been sustained. 8 7 The regulation by OFAC of informa-
tional materials, such as was demonstrated in Capital Cities,
should be considered constitutional because any limitation of
First Amendment concerns is merely incidental to the pursuit
of an important governmental interest in foreign affairs.
D. The Cernuda Decision Is Overly Broad
In dicta, the Cernuda court went too far in stating that the
Berman Amendment exempted all First Amendment materials
from regulation. 88 The court in Cernuda considered an issue
surrounded by political turmoil that erupted into violence. 89
These extreme circumstances were perhaps influential in the
court's formulation of an extremely broad and over-inclusive
definition of informational materials.' 90 The court's definition
is dictum because the case could have been resolved by exam-
ining either the tangible nature of paintings or OFAC's arbi-
trary actions.' 9 ' Although misstating the meaning and intent
of the Berman Amendment, the court reached the correct re-
sult given the tangible and informational nature of paint-
ings. 192 In addition, OFAC's lack of response to the two li-
censing applications can be seen as arbitrary and capricious. 9 3
The court in Cernuda should have dispensed with the litigation
without reaching its own definition of "other informational
186. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing lessening of Con-
stitutional protections in foreign affairs).
187. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing foreign policy and
the First Amendment).
188. See Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1550 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24 (discussing political turmoil sur-
rounding controversy).
190. See Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1545, 1550 n.10.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45 (discussing OFAC's actions as
arbitrary and capricious).
192. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing informational as-
pect of paintings).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45 (discussing OFAC's actions as
arbitrary and capricious).
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materials." "
If the Cernuda definition of "other informational materi-
als" were to be adopted, the definition could potentially affect
statutes other than TWEA. 95 Defining "other informational
materials" to include intangible items could possibly affect
technical data that are regulated under various statutes that
consider technical data to be informational. 196 Not only would
such a definition raise separation of powers issues and create a
loophole in presidential embargo powers, but it would also
create a conflict among U.S. statutes.' 9 7
CONCLUSION
U.S. courts should defer to OFAC decisions regarding the
scope of materials exempted from presidential regulation by
the Berman Amendment because the statutory language and
legislative history are unclear as to the meaning of "other in-
formational materials," and because these decisions do not vi-
olate the First Amendment. A clarification of the statutory di-
rective at issue would prove decisive in this matter. Until Con-
gress acts, however, the doctrine of separation of powers
mandates that the judiciary must not usurp congressional
power by legislating the definition of "other informational
materials." Thus, OFAC's interpretation must stand until
Congress determines otherwise by means of statutory clarifica-
tion of the meaning of the phrase "other informational materi-
als."
Laura A. Michalec *
194. See supra text accompanying note 191 (discussing Cernuda court's definition
as dicta).
195. See, e.g., Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988); Export and
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988).
196. See, e.g., Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988); Export and
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988). To prevent the export of
U.S. technical data to unfriendly foreign nations, Congress can restrict the flow of
information contained in certain items. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 53, at
740.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96 (discussing potential conflicts be-
tween statutes).
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